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Preaching the Constitution
by WILLIAM E. WIETHoFF*
Aftershocks of Lochner v. New York' have yet to subside.2 The
case is more about enduring issues in jurisprudence and constitutional
interpretation, and the relationship between masters and servants,
3
than it is about specific statutes and parties.4 "If we have learned any-
thing in this century," a historian of the Court has declared, "it is that
judges should not substitute their economic judgments for those of the
legislature."5 In the following pages, I argue that we have learned also
of selected judges' pious or impious devotion to the law as revealed in
the rhetorical amplification of their arguments.
I. Homiletic Form
The idea of reading the majority and dissenting opinions in Loch-
ner as homilies on the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with the
American religious tradition of promoting a faith based on human
reason,6 and the twentieth-century search for "secularized soteriolo-
gies."7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the most notorious voice in Loch-
ner, was steeped in the Puritan tradition of civil religion and active in
a "Metaphysical Club" of logical positivists.' Other voices welled up
* Professor, Department of Speech Communication, Indiana University.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Se4 e.g., Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeymen Bakers of New York.- The
Journeymen Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J. OF LEGAL HisT.
413 (1994).
3. See e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: Ti RISE AND DE-
MISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) [hereinafter CoNsTITU-
TION BESIEGED].
4. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1991).
5. BERNARD SCHWARTz, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 202 (2d ed. 1993).
6. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA, (E.S. Gaustad, ed. 1982);
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (John F. Wilson & Donald Drakeman, eds.,
2d ed. 1965).
7. PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY 125 (1967).
8. 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES
AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1756 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel, eds. 1969).
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from other traditions of faith. John Harlan, for example, was a Pres-
byterian elder.'
A homiletic reading illuminates judicial claims to authority and
the hallowed character of the Constitution in an ingenious if subcon-
scious argumentative strategy. Homiletic form varies depending on
time, place, and custom.10 Additionally, from the early Middle Ages
this sermonic discourse has featured rhetorical amplification based on
the four senses of scripture: literal, allegorical, tropological, and
anagogical.11 When expounding the literal sense, a homilist cites real
examples of the theme being addressed. When the allegorical sense is
emphasized, hypothetical examples are cited. Emphasizing the tropo-
logical sense leads to moral exhortation, and expounding the anagogi-
cal sense underscores the effects of the tropology.12
Homilists themselves enact the role of priestly exegetes in their
communication: they have been ordained to speak efficaciously so
long as they perform their office in an orthodox manner. The text
they expound is sacred in both origin and design. Moreover, if a
homilist addresses all four senses in the order defined above, then the
homily leads pious members of the congregation from fact, through
imagination and conscience, to a new and better state of communion
with virtuous ideals.
For example, one could do worse than read Philip Melanchthon's
1550 sermon, "The Safety of the Virtuous," in which he amplifies the
meaning of John 10:28.3 When he says:
"No man shall pluck my sheep out of my hand," he indicates
that he is "no idle spectator of our woe, but that mighty and
incessant strife is going on .... But the son of God, who holds
in his hands, as it were, the congregation of those who call upon
his name, hurls back the devils by his infinite power .... The
godly,... enjoy the beginnin of eternal life and obtain mitiga-
tion of the general distress."1
Literally speaking, sheep are protected. Allegorically, of course,
humans enjoy divine protection if they-in a tropological sense-pray
9. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE SUPREME CoURT JusTicEs: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTION-
ARY 208 (1994).
10. See generally JAMES J. MuRPHY, RHETORIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1974).
11. READINGS IN MEDIEVAL RHETORIC 170-71 (J.M. Miller et al., eds. 1973).
12. William M. Purcell, Eberhard the German and the Labyrinth of Learning: Gram-
mar, Poetry, Rhetoric and Pedagogy in Laborintus, 11 RHETORICA 95, 114 (1993).
13. 1 THE WORLD'S BEST ORATIONS 3007-12 (D.J. Brewer, ed. 1990) (quoting Me-
lanchthon's 1550 sermon).
14. Id.
for deliverance. Ultimately and anagogically, humans enjoy eternal
life.
My curt analysis of Melanchthon's preaching obscures formal
properties such as the amount of discourse he dedicated to ex-
pounding each of the scriptural senses, and I have not assessed the
homilist's claim to authority or his claim about the character of his
text. In my assessment of Lochner, I explain and illustrate more fully
these types of claims in judicial discourse.
A. Homiletic Form in Lochner
The critical approach to analyzing rhetorical amplification based
on the four senses of scripture can be adapted to examine Lochner as
a collection of three jurisprudential homilies. Though unusual, this
approach is preferable to viewing the case as a "three-ring circus."' 5
The apparent trinity of jurisprudential arguments represents a range
of orthodox, heretical, and apostate opinions that P. T. Barnum would
not have appreciated.
B. Literal Sense
Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham not only recited the
facts of the case but also recited the tension between the state power
to police contracts and the liberty interests of the individual worker.'6
In a literal sense, he expounded the law to the reader: "The question
whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be dis-
missed in a few words."' 7 In fact, he explained, the real controversy
involved "a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail-
the power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to
liberty of person and freedom of contract." 8 In the mind of the ma-
jority, "the limit of the police power" was exceeded by New York's
attempt to limit bakers' working hours, which the state justified based
on its need "to safeguard the public health or the health of the individ-
uals who are following the trade of a baker."' 9
Justice Peckham began with a literal exegesis of the Constitution,
devoting more than half of his opinion to this effort. In an ideally
legal culture, he noted, a literal interpretation would have been suffi-
15. Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three Ring Circus Revisited. The Drift Back to Lochner
Continues, 19 STETSON L. REv. 571 (1990).
16. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 52-58 (1905).
17. Id. at 57.
18. Id.
19. I1. at 58.
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cient.20 That interpretation would reflect the "judgment" of the law's
most prominent acolytes and express the perfectly "reasonable" stan-
dards of the Constitution.2 ' In Justice Peckham's opinion, the Court's
decision should have satisfied the lesser beings not occupying the
Supreme Court bench who mucked about in a state of impaired intel-
lect. His opinion literally puts these legal suppliants in touch with
reality.
Yet to the dismay of Justice Peckham, his fellow "priest," Justice
Harlan, dissented and was joined in this heresy by Justices White and
Day. These three schismatics were especially pernicious because they
also began their exegesis with a literal interpretation, devoting almost
three-quarters of their homily to expounding reality.' Worse yet,
they inferred reality, the reality that "this statute was enacted in order
to protect the physical well-being of those who work in bakery and
confectionery establishments,"' not only from legal precedents but
also from professorial opinions and bureaucratic statistics.2 4 From this
heretical viewpoint, supreme acolytes such as Justice Peckham mistak-
enly performed the rites of law for devout but ignorant worshippers of
that law. However, the Constitution survives even the blasphemy of
its high priests because it is the perfection of reason.
But there was also apostasy. Like his brethren, Justice Holmes
began his dissent with a literal interpretation, devoting the bulk of his
brief homily to debunking the notions of judicial otherness and ration-
ality.25 His argument is substantively clear, but its amplified form ren-
ders more vital this apostate's retreat from the true faith. He cites
precedent, but these cases upheld laws about whose constitutionality
judges disagree because of their various "convictions or prejudices.
26
Thus, the high priests are no more elevated than the congregational
masses, or the Constitution itself is not perfectly reasonable, or both
propositions are true.
The primacy and scope of literal amplification suggests that the
Court saw redemption simply in attending to the facts. But the ortho-
dox believers, heretics, and apostate disagreed whether the facts relat-
ing to baking bread could be appreciated only in the light of legal
precedent and police power. The heretics did not share the orthodox
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id at 65-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 69.
24. Id. at 70-71.
25. Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 75.
appreciation of the facts, yet these brethren did not dispute the juris-
prudential means of appreciation. The apostate rejected the very
means of appreciating these facts because he could not rule out judi-
cial prejudice toward an "economic theory."27
Litigation is about winning and losing. In Lochner, the orthodox
view prevailed over the degraded faith of lesser acolytes in New York.
However, both the orthodox believers and the heretics won a larger
victory. Their victory, gained largely from literal interpretation, sus-
tained the worship of an unbiased judiciary and a perfectly reasonable
Constitution. On the losing side, like the ancient prophets who as-
sailed the popular conscience of Israel, the voice of Justice Holmes
was a cry in the wilderness.
C. Allegorical Sense
Justice Peckham amplified his orthodoxy allegorically by deni-
grating legislative attempts to interfere with "the trade of a baker" on
the basis of protecting public health:
But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative major-
ities? A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinet-
maker, a dry goods clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's or a physician's
clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come
under the power of the legislature, on this assumption.'
Peckham must have known that his argument was rhetorical
rather than logical. Note, for example, his use of rhetorical question,
invective, anaphora, and several subspecies of figures as well as light/
dark imagery. But preachers are ordained to exhort congregations as
well as instruct them about the true faith. They are permitted to alle-
gorize about "extreme cases" when the faithful are being lured by "in-
valid" appeals.2 9
Justice Harlan, dissenting from the orthodox conclusion but not
from Justice Peckham's method of analysis, allegorized about the con-
stitutionality of a statute prohibiting bakers from working more than
eighteen hours a day for reasons of public health, rather than the ten-
hour limit at issue in the case. "No one," he surmised, "could dispute
the power of the State to enact such a statute."30 Again in a sheerly
rhetorical mode (he cited no precedent or legal argument, but took
judicial notice of "serious consideration among civilized peoples"),3 '
27. Id. at 74.
28. Id at 59.
29. Id at 61.
30. Id at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 72.
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Justice Harlan, the heretic, denied that his doctrine was "extreme or
exceptional."3 2
Similar to Justice Harlan's technique, Justice Holmes amplified
his apostasy allegorically by speculating on the range of "opinions," or
prejudices, that might be found "natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking" by his brethren.3 Hypothetically, he concluded, the
"accident of our finding certain opinions" unpalatable should have
nothing to do with constitutional scrutiny of statutes that happen to
embody these opinions.
34
The homiletic or rhetorical tenor of allegorical interpretation may
escape the notice of casual listeners and readers who are not conver-
sant with terms of art such as "judicial notice" and who do not expect
Supreme Court justices to engage in factual speculation. But the type
of allegory found in Lochner is commonplace. Constitutional acolytes
commonly use it to emphasize the absurd results of failing to accept
their interpretation of reality. For example, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,35 Justice O'Connor wrote of the criticism, ostracism, or vio-
lence that may befall those judges who are closely identified with wa-
tershed decisions. 6 Moreover, allegorical interpretation in a judicial
opinion prepares the legal congregation for tropology by arousing
feelings of indignation.
C. Ropological Interpretation
A homiletic tropology is an exhortation to morality. In Lochner,
only the opinion of Justice Holmes fits this affirmative mold. The
other opinions contain warnings to avoid immorality.
Justice Peckham insisted that the New York legislature enacted
"an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers
and employ[ee]s, to make contracts regarding labor."37 The act be-
longed to that class of laws that are "meddlesome interferences with
the rights of the individual. '38 The New York law ran "counter to that
liberty of person and of free contract provided for in the Federal Con-
stitution. ' 39 Because Peckham read the Constitution as the perfection
of reason, he felt that the impious and blasphemous New York legisla-
32. Id.
33. Id- at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Id-
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. Id. at 867.
37. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 62.
ture was diverting employers and employees from the right path.
Thus it was necessary to strike down the statute in order to abjure
irrational constraints on personal liberty.
The heretics most clearly defined their heresy on this tropological
level. Justice Harlan insisted that the Constitution left "room for de-
bate and for an honest difference of opinion" on the issue at hand:
What is the true ground for the State to take between legitimate
protection, by legislation, of the public health and liberty of con-
tract is not a question easily solved, nor one in respect of which
there is or can be absolute certainty.
40
According to Justice Harlan, the legislature of New York was in
the best position, a constitutionally permissible position, to determine
whether the statutory limits protected a baker's "physical and mental
capacity to serve the State."' 41 Moreover, the brethren should not
"presume that the State of New York has acted in bad faith."'42
Rather, it was the brethren's duty "to sustain the statute as not being
in conflict with the Federal Constitution, for the reason-and such is
an all-sufficient reason-it is not shown to be plainly and palpably
inconsistent with that instrument."43
The path to perfect jurisprudence is not the straight and narrow
way identified by Justice Peckham. From the heretical perspective,
the Constitution embodies perfect reason but not all that is perfectly
reasonable. It does not exhaustively and exclusively provide for lib-
erty of person and of free contract as claimed by the orthodox believ-
ers. It merely aids its acolytes in discovering what is reasonable and
thus provides a broad and winding path to jurisprudential perfection.
Preaching apostasy, Justice Holmes argued even more radically.
He insisted that the Constitution was altogether useless in this
instance:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law."
In essence, Justice Holmes insisted tropologically that Lochner
should be decided on the basis of opinion that has become authorita-
40. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 72.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 73.
44. Id at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tive by tradition rather than on the basis of truth that is authoritative
by revelation. His justification is appealing because he stressed ra-
tionality and fairness, qualities of eminently moral people. However,
the humane source of these qualities was unpalatable to both the or-
thodox believers and the heretics who revered respectively the Consti-
tution as a normative or instrumental document.
The hortatory tone of these passages in Lochner is unmistakable.
As in Puritanism, the Justices preached a civil religion based on the
worship of reason. Whether substantive and immutable, in the ortho-
dox view, or instrumental and versatile as the heretics believed, the
Constitution illuminated what is perfectly reasonable in every case.
For the apostate Justice Holmes, rational answers were instead to be
found within human experience and the opinions that naturally domi-
nate that realm.
D. Anagogical Interpretation
Identifying the outcome of treading a moral path-or, in the case
of most judicial discourse in Lochner, the outcome of losing one's
way-was the predictable conclusion of each homily. Justice
Peckham concluded with a comparatively lengthy indictment of what
could happen if his brethren did not strike down the statute at issue.
He predicted that "[t]he State ... would assume the position of a
supervisor, or paterfamilias, over every act of the individual" in a bla-
tantly "unreasonable and entirely arbitrary" violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.-' Justice Peckham also warned that "[t]his
interference on the parts of the legislatures of the several States with
the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the
increase," and cited analogous instances in Washington, Illinois, and
New York.4 6 He further pleaded for wide understanding of the true
believers' labors, stating that it was "impossible for us to shut our
eyes" to the unreasonable, that is, the constitutionally impermissible
motives of state legislatures.47 The "natural... effect" of related stat-
utes, he exhorted, called for the type of protective effort being ex-
pended by the Lochner majority.4a And then, in jurisprudential cant,
he reversed and remanded the case.
Decrying the orthodox conclusion but not its jurisprudential
method, the heretics explicitly diverged from legal logic ("I take leave
45. Id at 62.
46. Id at 63.
47. Id at 64.
48. Id
to say," wrote Justice Harlan4 9), and insisted that the statute "cannot
be held to be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, without
enlarging the scope of the Amendment far beyond its original pur-
pose" and without usurping the proper authority of state legisla-
tures.50 This aberration would "involve consequences of a far-
reaching and mischievous character," crippling the care of their citi-
zens by the states.51 Indeed, the heretics reported with grave concern
that the Court had previously held a Kansas statute of the same type
to be constitutional.
52
The outcome predicted by the apostate Justice Holmes was rhe-
torically as irritating as his tropology. He simply observed that rea-
sonable people will hold different views of "inequality"53 no matter
which conclusion, orthodox or heretical, was pronounced by the court.
In Justice Holmes' view, the Constitution provided no guidance, and
the outcome of any dispute related to the Fourteenth Amendment
would always remain in doubt unless the Supreme Court acolytes
prejudicially adopted a particular economic theory.
Whether orthodox or heretical, the corresponding anagogical in-
terpretations were more comforting and palatable in the dominant
culture of the Lochner era than was Justice Holmes' apostasy. The
same is true today. The belief system of the dominant culture affirms
access to equality for all Americans because of a clear formula ex-
pressed in the Constitution. No jurisprudential homily would ring
true in this culture unless the homilist preached a sure and certain
code on the order of the Ten Commandments. For Justice Holmes
and all apostates, the search for justice remains more unsettled than
consulting a code or a commandment. Reason may also flourish in
the opinions that rise and fall as time and place change.
H. Conclusion
The Lochner arguments may be analyzed in uncommon ways be-
cause Supreme Court Justices wield extraordinary power and exercise
this power through various rhetorical means. One of these methods is
homiletic amplification. Wrapping their arguments in a homily impli-
cates the high-priestly role of the Justices and leads readers from fact,
through imagination and conscience, to idealism. Homiletic amplifi-
49. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. Id
51. I&
52. Id. at 74.
53. Id. at 76.
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cation induces belief in the justice of an opinion as well as its legal
validity.
In a perfect legal culture, according to Justices Peckham, Harlan,
and Holmes, the court would need only literal amplification. Judicial
recitation of facts would be sufficient to persuade readers of the jus-
tice in an opinion. However, because of human society's flawed ca-
pacity to appreciate judicial and therefore pristine reasoning, Justices
also resort to allegorical and tropological amplification. These inter-
pretations of facts probe the conscience of readers who might other-
wise sin against justice, and fire the imagination, especially when the
results of ignoring or resisting the decision would be absurd and ugly.
Ultimately, the lowly beings served by high priests of the law need to
appreciate the effects of their legal and illegal conduct, virtue, and
vice. Anagogical amplification highlights these effects while affirming
the interpretive authority of the Justices and the impeachable rational-
ity of their dogma. In Lochner, the dogma was the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Thus both the form and content of argument demand critical at-
tention. When attending to the homiletic form in particular, critics of
argument are faced with rhetorical tactics including embedded claims
to authority and to legitimacy. Moreover, homiletic amplification fea-
tures claims to piety in the performance of law that may be express or
implied. The melange of claims and their variable degrees of expres-
sion challenge the most attentive of critics to account for argumenta-
tion that, in addition, invites the readers of the law to link legal and
moral norms.
